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Summary findings
Serra analyzes  subsidies  in Chile's  public  utilities.  Over  Chile's  experience  also shows  that it is possible  to use
the last decade, especially,  significant  efforts  have been  subsidies  that do not distort people's  behavior-by
made  to extend public  services  to rural populations.  An  making  sure that they perceive  the marginal  cost of
explicit  consumption  subsidy  for potable  water (targeted  providing  the service.  In rural  areas it is advisable  to
to the poorest 20 percent of the population)  currently  introduce  consumption  subsidies  with an upper limit on
benefits  17 percent of the population.  the amount subsidized,  so that when a family  consumes
Cross-subsidies  have  been virtually  eliminated  in Chile,  more  than the subsidized  amount,  it perceives  at the
and existing  subsidies  are funded  from the national  margin  the total cost of providing  the service.
budget.  The elimination  of cross-subsidies  has facilitated  In rural zones  where  there is no infrastructure,
competition  in some services.  Prices  have fallen  investment  needs to be subsidized.  Users  do not pay the
substantially  in services  that new operators  have entered,  long-run  marginal  cost,  but it is important  that the rate
showing  that regulation  is a poor substitute  for  charged  at least cover the short-term  marginal  cost.  In
competition.  other words,  rural utility charges  are required  to cover
The Chilean  experience  shows  that it is possible  to  the system's  operating  costs.
design  direct subsidies  (such  as the one for drinking  For those who argue that the poor would  be better off
water) at relatively  low  cost to the state. Moreover,  with cash  transfers  (choosing  their own consumption
putting rural infrastructure  projects  out to public  tender  baskets),  Serra  outlines  the arguments  for subsidizing
whenever  possible  has allowed  substantial  reductions  in  utilities,  beyond  the moral  value  of giving  the poor access
government  spending.  to public  services  considered  basic  for existence.
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Abstract
This paper makes an  analysis of  subsidies in  Chile's public utilities. Rates
rebalancing  have practically eliminated cross subsidies,  and current programs are funded
from the national budget. Over the last decade in particular,  significant efforts have been
made to extend  public services  to rural populations,  and a consumption  subsidy  for potable
water currently  benefits 17%  of the population.
The Chilean experience shows it is possible to design subsidies  targeted to the
poor that do not cause deadweight losses, and at relatively low cost to the State. The
elimination of  cross  subsidies has  facilitated competition in  some public  services.
Moreover,  putting rural infrastructure  projects out to public tender, whenever  possible,  has
made it possible  to substantially  reduce  government  expenditure
1.  Introduction
The purpose  of this paper is to analyze  Chile's utility  subsidization  programs.  These
include investrnent  subsidies  in all utilities, which aim to develop rural infrastructure  by
providing  supplementary  funding  for projects  that are socially  but not privately  profitable.  In
fact, the maximum  subsidy  may not be greater  than either the (negative)  private net present
value (NPV) or the total investment.  Thus, users should be able to finance the operation,
maintenance,  and administration  of the service.  Normally  it is the potential  beneficiaries  of a
project  that  request  a subsidy,  although  occasionally  the initiative  comes from local or central
authorities.  Since  resources  are limited,  one criterion  used to prioritize  projects  has been the
social  NPV per peso  of subsidy  required.
There is also a targeted  consumption  subsidy  for both urban and rural households  in
the case of drinking  water, the consumption  of which has always been subsidized  in Chile.
Formerly,  water the charges  were below  the cost of providing  the service  and there was no
incentive  to collect bad debts. Thanks to this policy, however, for many years now the
coverage  of drinkable  water has been very extensive,  with 98% of urban homes and 76% of
2households in rural concentrated zones connected to potable water services by 1987 (see Ale,
1990). However, the introduction of cost-reflecting pricing rules in 1989 prior to privatization
of the water companies, made it necessary to introduce an explicit consumption subsidy. This
is targeted on the poorest 20% of the population, and subsidizes the first  1Sm 3 of monthly
consumption by between 40% and 85%. The subsidy rate is higher in tariff-zones where water
charges are higher and the average income of the poorest 10 % of the population is lower.
The subsidization of public utilities forms part of the  government's  social policy.
Although subsidies represent a minor part of the country's social expenditure, it is legitimate
to question whether the poor would not be better off receiving cash transfers. Opponents of
specific  subsidies  argue  that,  with  lump-sum transfers,  beneficiaries  can  choose  their
consumption basket for themselves, thereby maximizing their utility. It is also claimed that
specific subsidy programs have higher administrative costs than cash transfers do. In view of
these claims, next we discuss the validity of subsidizing public utilities.
In the first place, utility subsidies are justified by the existence of positive externalities.
Theory  shows  that  private  expenditure  on  goods  that  generate  positive  consumption
externalities is likely to fall below the socially optimal level. There are clearly significant
externalities in the consumption of drinkable water and  sewerage services, as  households
without sanitary services are likely to be more prone to diseases, which are then transmitted to
other families. Moreover, part of the cost of the illnesses arising from the lack of sanitation is
borne by the public health services that care for vulnerable households. A different sort of
externality exists in telecom services, namely network economies. When a new user joins a
network, this benefits not only the user concerned but also the existing subscribers whose
communication  possibilities also expand.
3A second reason for subsidizing utilities is the substantial scale economies involved
in  providing public  services, especially in  low-density rural  areas. With  a regulated  or
agreed price, revenues might be insufficient to cover total costs, yet the project could well
be socially profitable if the consumer surplus at the given price exceeds the social costs.
One alternative would be to  allow the price to rise until  the private NPV of the project
turned positive, but, given the low density of demand in rural areas, scale economies are
large, and the price that makes the investment privately profitable could be much higher
than the marginal cost of production. As a result, adopting this price could cause significant
efficiency losses. Moreover, a price that allows the investment to be fully financed might
not even exist.
This  problem  would  be  solved  by  seeking  an  initial  contribution  from  the
beneficiaries,  or  by  applying a  two-part  tariff  consisting  of a  per-unit  charge  equal  to
marginal cost plus a  standing charge that allows the service to be  financed.  In order to
finance the investment, people with greater willingness to pay might have to make a larger
contribution; however, all the incentives for free riding are present in such a situation. In
fact, in the case of the rural electrification subsidy, interested parties can make voluntary
contributions, which by lowering the subsidy required would have the effect of increasing
the priority assigned to the project. However, in practice such contributions have not been
forthcoming, and, in  any event, the transaction costs  of eliciting potential  beneficiaries'
willingness to pay could be so high that a subsidy becomes a more efficient solution.
A third reason for subsidizing utilities is that their consumption by poor households
may enter directly into the social utility function. If such is the case, then maximizing social
welfare implies  subsidizing certain  goods and  services and  not  simply transferring  un-
4earmarked  money  to  people  in  need.  Harberger  (1978)  argues  that  free  education,
subsidized medical care; food and housing for the poor are all standard fixtures in today's
world, in developed and developing countries alike. Attempts to convert such subsidies into
their cash equivalent regardless of how the cash might be spent have everywhere faltered
and failed. Harberger believes that this might reflect the value systems of our societies. For
instance, he argues, a look at intra-family transfers shows that these seem to be aimed more
at financing specific expenditures or "needs", rather than representing a systematic sharing
of  wealth through  cash  transfers.  The  success  of  initiatives  to  assist  people  that  have
suffered misfortune is another indication of the same phenomenon. Thereby, it is easier for
low-income people to  articulate their  demands in  terms of  specific goods and  services,
given their receptivity in society, thanjustify  demands for higher income.
Waddams Price (1999) believes that the public perceives utilities as services that are
necessary for life, thereby challenging the idea that these are services that consumers freely
choose whether to buy. Moreover, society seems to have a special regard for the needs of
consumers  living in  rural and  isolated areas, as  illustrated by  the strong  impact of TV
reports describing the isolation of remote areas of the country and how their inhabitants
endure medical and other emergencies. Doble, Markou and Waddams Price (1998) report
that 73% of respondents in a sample-survey of 1,685 people in the UK believe that water
should be  provided at  a  subsidized rate to  households  who  are unable to  afford  it for
themselves.  The corresponding figures  for  electricity and  telephony  are 67%  and  53%,
respectively.
Sometimes the reasons underlying programs to subsidize certain goods or services
are more debatable, but these are normally not made explicit. One such is paternalism: the
5State knows best how what to spend resources on, especially when these cater to the needs
of poor households with little education. To the above could be added the desire to populate
remote areas of the country for reasons of national sovereignty. In brief, there are a variety
of reasons justifying the use of specific subsidies, for which reason the rest of this article
takes their continued existence as given and focuses on discussing their effectiveness.
Over the last five years in particular, Chile has made great efforts to extend public
services to rural populations, and programs to subsidize rural infrastructure have benefited
numerous families. The proportion of electrified rural homes rose from  57% in  1994 to
75% in 1999, at a total cost on the order of US$ 130 million, and the aim is to have reached
all rural households by 2005. Drinking water coverage in concentrated  rural areas grew
from 81% in 1994 to 93% in 1998, with the State contributing US$ 110 million to this end;
projections are for 98% of the concentrated rural population to have running water by the
end of the year 2000. In addition, 80% of the rural population will have access to public
telephones by 2000, compared to just  10% in 1995, with the corresponding program having
spent  US$  20  million  in  its  first  five  years  of  operation.  Lastly,  the  drinking  water
consumption subsidy benefits  17% of the population, at an annual cost of about US$ 30
million.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the drinking water
consumption subsidy. The following sections provide an overview of subsidies supporting
rural investment in potable water, electricity and telecommunications, respectively. Section
6 analyzes  the  efficacy of  subsidy programs,  and  the  final  section  draws  conclusions.
62.  Consumption subsidy in water and sanitation services 3
In the late 1980s, water rates were on average less than half of what was needed to
finance provision of the service, with prices covering less than 20% of outlays in regions with
higher  production costs.  Tthis  form  of  subsidy was  highly  inefficient  (users  were  not
confronted with the real cost of water services), and the benefits were greater among high-
income families who consumed larger amounts. Prior to privatization,  however, charges had to
be raised so that the water companies could cover their costs. Unlike what happened with the
other public services, the process that should have  led to  the privatization of  the water
companies was only started in the final stages of the military regime (1973-1989), and it could
not  be  concluded before democracy was  restored. The need to  raise charges acted as  a
significant hindrance to the rapid transfer of sanitation companies to the private sector, as
privatization  accompanied by a substantial price hike would have been politically unpopular.
Sectoral  modernization  had  begun  in  1977,  with  the  creation  of  the  Servicio
Nacional  de  Obras Sanitarias  (Sendos) at the  Ministry  of  Public  Works.  This  service
absorbed  several  agencies  belonging  to  different  ministries  and  made  it  possible  to
downsize the workforce  from 10,000 to 3,000. Apart  from regulatory responsibilities  for
the whole sector, Sendos was put in charge of providing water services in the regions. In
the same year, water companies were set up in the Santiago Metropolitan Region (Emos)
and  in the Vth Region (Esval), based  on pre-existing small companies. Emos  and Esval
were also related to the State through the Ministry of Public Works. The creation of Sendos
represented a significant change of approach. Until then, the financing of the service was
3 This section builds on Blanlot (1999) and Mideplan (1999).
7not one of the government agencies'  objectives, which led among another things to a total
lack of interest in chasing bad debts.  Without changing water rates, Sendos was able to
significantly  increase  water  company  revenues  merely  by  being  more  energetic  in
collecting arrears.
In 1988, a new regulatory framework was set up for the sector, closely matching its
electricity sector counterpart. The new rate system allows for the self-financing of efficient
firms.  Pricing zones with  relatively homogeneous costs were  also  established. The new
pricing system was introduced gradually as from 1990, and charges rose by an average of
90% in real terms between 1990 and 1994, although by this time the rate adjustment process
was still not complete in all regions. The price rise was steeper in areas with higher costs,
exceeding 500% in some cases, and by 1998 average regional water rates ranged from USO
43 to USO 121 per m3 of consumption. Arrears were cut from 7.9% in 1990 to 2.9% in 1994,
as a result of a more commercial approach, whereby the subsidy policy gave incentives for
prompt payment, and firms were given faculties to suspend services to customers in arrears.
In 1994 the average rate of return on capital among public water companies was 6.3%, with
the profitability of individual firms ranging between -4.5% and 13.2%.4
Antedating the rate hike, in February 1989 a demand subsidy for water and sewerage
services was introduced. This was targeted on the poorest urban families, defined initially as
the poorest 20% in each region. Potential beneficiaries had to apply for the subsidy in their
municipality, which entailed filling out a socioeconomic evaluation form (SEF), unless they
had already done this for other purposes. Eligibility criteria included having no arrears with
4 In 1998  the rate of return  on equity  for the public  sanitation  companies  ranged  from  -6.9 percent  to 11.9
percent with  an average  of 6,6 percent.
8the water company, or  having negotiated payment thereof, and  consumption of less than
20m 3 per month. By August 1991 the subsidy was only reaching 14.  1% of estimated potential
beneficiaries. The government's take on this situation was that the eligibility criteria were too
stringent,  and  this  led  to  their  relaxation. 5 In  1991 a  legal  amendment  abolished  the
requirement of  consuming less than  20 m3 of  water per  month,  suspended the no-debt
requirement till the end of the year, authorized water companies to submit applications on
behalf of their clients until December, 6 and extended the subsidy to families sharing a house
and to housing compounds sharing a water meter. By the end of the year, 42% of estimated
potential beneficiaries were being subsidized.
The subsidy program is funded from the annual budget of the central government,
which allocates resources to  regional governments. These, in turn, distribute the available
funds  among their  municipalities. In  the  event  of  a  municipality not  having  sufficient
resources to finance all eligible applications, it has to assign the available funds between
applicants according to their SEF point scores. The municipalities pay the subsidies directly
to the water companies, and customers are billed for the difference.
Initially the subsidy was equal to 50% of the bill, up to a consumption of 1  Om 3. In
August 1991 a subsidy range was introduced, from a minimum 40% to a maximum 75% of
the  monthly bill  for  consumption up  to  15m 3. The purpose  of this  amendment  was to
provide greater relief in regions where rate rebalancing would lead to larger price increases.
Regionally differentiated subsidies were implemented for the first time in 1993. In the three
regions where potable water is dearest (Regions I, II, XI), the subsidy was raised to 75%,
5 The initial  lack  of interest  in applying  for the subsidies  could also be explained  by the gradualness  of the
price increase, which made it less urgent to apply for the subsidy at the outset
9while in the regions where it is cheapest (VIII, XII, and Metropolitan) it was held at 50%;
the subsidy for intermediates zones was set at 60%.
In  1994 the legislation was amended once  again to  include  economic need as  a
determninant  of the subsidy; the range was widened to 25%-85%, and maximum subsidizable
consumption was increased from 15m 3 to 20 m3. This amendment also authorized setting more
than one subsidy rate within a region. With a view to concentrating resources in regions with
higher poverty indices, the population target was redefined as the poorest 20% nationwide,
instead of  the previous  regional definition. The  law  also  extended the  subsidy to  rural
consumers as from 1995,  to cover 50% of the bill for the first 15 m3 of water consumed.
In 1996, the socioeconomic condition of the region and the rate zone to which the
beneficiary  belonged  began  to  be  used  in  calculating  the  subsidy  rate,  although  the
subsidizable consumption limit was maintained at 1  Sm 3. The subsidy rate varied from 82%
in rate zone 2 of Region I and 50% in the Metropolitan Region. Political considerations
made it unfeasible to reduce the initial subsidy rate of 50% in low-cost areas. The absolute
difference between subsidy amounts is greater still: in 1998, the average monthly subsidy
varied between Ch$ 9,305 and Ch$  1,337. The average monthly subsidy in urban areas is
on the order of Ch$ 2,800, considerably above the rural equivalent of Ch$ 400.
The  long-run  goal  is  to  comply  with  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO)
recommendation that families should spend no more than 5% of their income on water and
sanitation services. As a national average, the after-subsidy bill for a consumption of 15m 3
accounts for 5.5% of the average income earned by a family in the tenth decile, but this
figure varies widely from region to region. The bill for consuming 15m 3 of water ranges
6 The possibility that companies could submit applications for their customers was made permanent in 1994.
10from 2.8% to  11.9% of average family  income in the first decile, depending on regional
income and the pricing zone. For a family in the IXth Region with the average income of
the  lowest  decile  (Ch$  25,710  per  month)  and  living  in  the  second  pricing  zone,  a
consumption of 1  Sm 3 would account for 34% of its income (Ch$ 8,752). Since the subsidy
rate for this zone is 65%, the household would end up spending  11.9% of its income on
water and sanitation services.
The  subsidy  program  has  been  quite  successful  in  several  respects,  firstly  in
reaching the target population. By the end of 1997 the number of urban subsidies stood at
443,953, and rural subsidies totaled 61,435; as a result subsidies were covering 95% of total
estimated potential beneficiaries (see Table  1). Most importantly, 72.8% of beneficiaries
were in the poorest group as measured by their SEF scores. From the standpoint of results,
despite the sharp rise in charges, the coverage of potable water did not decline, but actually
increased. By 1998, 99.3% of all urban families had running water, of which  17.4% were
subsidized.
Another advantage of the new  subsidy is  its  low cost  compared to  the previous
system. In 1998, the funding allocated  to the urban program totaled Ch$  15,479 million
(excluding  the administrative  cost  borne  by  the  municipalities),  plus  Ch$  600  million
assigned to the rural subsidy program. This  figure represents  31% of the net profits  of
State-owned water companies, in that year, which amounted to Ch$ 49,452 million. The
average rate  of return in  State-owned water companies was 6.6% in  1998, and in  1997
subsidies accounted for  6.3% of public  water companies'  total billings.7 This  compares
7There  is a sharp  inter-regional  variation  in the relation  between  subsides  and total  billings,  ranging  from
18%  in Region  IX  to 3% in the Santiago  Metropolitan  Region.
11favorably with the previous situation in which water providers were unable even to cover
operating  costs,  and  is  mainly  the  result  of  subsidy  targeting  and  setting  limits  on
subsidized consumption.
Table 1: Water consumption subsidy: beneficiaries and subsidy amounts in 1998
Beneficiary users  Subsidy  Expenditure  as  a
Region  Number  % of population  Average  amount  in  % of bill  %  of  family
Ch$  income (%)
I  19,096  21.1  7,247  73  2.9
82  2.9
II  25,051  24.6  8,257  80  2.8
75  3.2
III  17,147  30.5  6,172  70  4.0
__________________  ~  ~75  7.5
Iv  21,902  18.4  4,209  60  5.5
62  6.4
62  6.7






VI  17,681  15.5  2,740  60  6.0
60  4.8
VIl  27,706  21.4  3,427  60  6.7
64  7.3
72  5.8
vIII  63,925  22.0  3268  60  5.7
________  _______  65  6.2
IX  35,816  31.9  4,236  60  9.5
72  11.9
60  12.0
x  25,883  24.6  3,731  65  7.8
65  5.5
75  5.9
xi  6,002  35.2  5,389  80  5.4
75  3.8
XII  6,255  18.1  3,759  60  4.7
60  4.7
Metropolitan  103,001  10.4  1,970  50  3.6
1  1  1~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~50  I2.9
PAIS  432,499  17.4  5.5
Source:  Blanlot  (1999)
Although the subsidy program has been improved over time, the goal of no family spending
more than 5% of its income on water and sanitation services has not yet been achieved. At
the aggregate level, the target  has  almost been reached: the after-subsidy bill  for  15m 3
12water consumption accounts on average for 5.5% of the mean income of a family in the
lowest income decile nationwide. However, there is sharp regional disparity, and of course
within  each  region  not  all  first-decile  families receive  the  average  income.  Reducing
regional disparities should not be very complicated, but at the individual level it could be
more  difficult.  One  possibility  would  be  to  differentiate  subsidy rates  according  to  a
family's  SEF point score.
Table 2: Water consumption subsidy: beneficiaries and expenditure 1990-1998
YEAR  ESTIMATED  ACTUAL  COVERAGE  EXPENDITURE  EXPENDITURE
POTENTIAL  SUBSIDIES  %  Ch$  million  at  Ch$  million  at
BENEFICIARIES  GRANTED  current prices  1998 prices
1990  424,625  21,842  5.1  3.5  7,980
1991  424,625  177,719  41.9  263.0  503,893
1992  441,040  315,901  71.6  2,255.7  3,654,189
1993  443,068  351,925  79.4  4,437.2  6,506,373
1994  454,038  389,712  85.8  7,129.8  9,268,727
1995  461,508  399,205  86.5  9,305.8  11,166,935
1996  466,508  442,524  94.6  12,053.5  13,505,565
1997  466,508  443,953  95.2  14,339.,0  15,055,950
1998  466,508  115,479.1 *  15,479,065
Source: Ministry of Economics
*Allocated in national budget
133.  National rural drinking water program
This  program, which  began  in  the  1960s, is  currently  the  responsibility  of  the
Ministry  of Public  Works  (MOP).  It  mainly  finances the  installation  of potable  water
services in rural areas, although part of the funds are used to expand, improve and refurbish
existing rural systems. Interested parties submit projects through their municipalities. The
main requirement is to  form a  concentrated  rural zone, which  means grouping  together
more than  150 permanent residents with a density of over  15 dwellings per km of road.
Projects are appraised using  an established methodology, and approval is  given to those
with a positive NPV at discount rate of 12%.
With the portfolio of approved projects, the MOP requests funding from the Finance
Ministry, whose job it is to decide the amount to be allocated to each region and provide for
this  in the national budget. Once the annual budget as been approved by  Congress, the
MOP  informs  regional  governments  of  the  available  funding  and  the  list  of  projects
approved. Each regional government selects which projects to execute, according to its own
criteria  and  priorities,  using  up  all  the  funds  assigned.  The  MOP  is  responsible  for
executing the projects selected, for which purpose it contracts technical direction from the
respective regional water company. The water company is paid between  12% and 15% of
the  value  of  the project  for this  service.  Starting  in  2000,  following  water  company
privatization, projects will be put out to tender among the different water companies, and
eventually bidding could be opened up to other firms as well.
The Treasury keeps ownership of the civil works, but delegates their management to
local agents, who have to form a management committee to determine the rate of charge,
14among other things.  The consumption charge must at least finance the operating costs of
the system, except for technical assistance, which is funded through the Program. The MOP
outsources this to the water companies  and oversees execution. By late  1998 there were
1,049 rural drinking water  services catering to  1,318 localities, with  a total  of 202,734
installations benefiting 1,117,842 households. By the end of 2000 the aim is to achieve a
coverage of 98% of the concentrated rural population, representing between 30% and 40%
of the total rural population.
Table 3: National rural drinking water program
Year  Budget  Expenditure  Connections  Localities  Coverage
Ch$  million Ch$  million Ch$  million installed  benefited  %
(current  (current  (Dec.1998
prices)  prices)  prices)
1994  2,048.4  1,551.8  2,060.8  1,103  9  81
1995  8,124.5  7,113.5  8,728.2  5,434  38  82
1996  10,254.7  9,657.3  11,049.5  5,353  38  83
1997  14,079.2  13,454.6  14,467.3  9,215  79  90
1998  20,787.2  20,439.4  20,835.3  8,789  64  93
1999  20,760.0  1  _
Source:  Ministry  of Public  Works
As table 3 shows, spending on the program grew tenfold between 1994 and 1998,
which made it possible to increase the number of localities benefited by seven times. Part of
the funds are spent on technical assistance, although the budget for 1999 stipulated that no
more than Ch$ 915.5 million should be spent on this item, in other words less than 4.4% of
the total budget. Ignoring the fact that part of the funds are spent on technical assistance
and on refurbishing existing services, the average annual cost per mains connection varied
in this period between Ch$ 1.6 and Ch$ 2.4 million, so the subsidy received per family is
15significant. On the other hand, the annual average number of main connections per project
varied between 137 and 117, which shows that the program is reaching small localities.
In  1994, a program  was set  up  to  support the conservation  of  existing  rural
drinking water systems, as the Rural Drinking Water Program tends to focus on funding
new systems. The aim of this new subsidy is to support the expansion, improvement and
refurbishment of existing services, with funding for pre-investment studies as well as for
the work itself. The corresponding regulations were approved in 1998, but funds have not
yet been allocated from the national budget.
Publicizing this program will be the responsibility of the municipalities, which will
have to foment citizen participation. Every year the MOP will prepare a list of projects,
based  on its  own  data  and  the needs  put  forward by  rural  communities  using  a  form
distributed  by  MOP.  The latter  will  estimate  the cost  of each  project  as  well  as  the
contribution demanded  of the community, since beneficiaries  are expected to  contribute
part of  the  financing.  The  size  of the  contribution will  depend  on  the  socioeconomic
situation  of  the  community,  as  calculated  by  an  established  methodology.  With  this
informnation,  communities  that decide  to  apply for the  subsidy can do  so through  their
respective municipalities.
The MOP  will  draw up  a  list of  projects  for each  region.  The annual  budget
prepared  by  the  Finance  Ministry  and  approved  by  Congress  will  contain  the  funds
assigned to each region. In December each year, the MOP will send regional governments a
list  with  evaluated projects  that  it  is  possible  to  finance,  together  with  the  amount of
funding, and the contribution required from applicants. Regional Governments will select
16the projects to execute, taking into account their social return, the socioeconomic condition
of the beneficiaries, the payment capacity of the community applying for the subsidy.
174.  Rural Electrification Program
Electricity coverage is almost 100% in urban zones, so government support in this
sector has focused on rural areas. Subsidies are provided to finance self-generation projects,
extensions of the distribution network and feasibility studies. The maximum subsidy is for
an amount equal to the negative private NPV of the project, which means that beneficiaries
and distribution companies are expected to contribute to a project's  financing. In particular,
beneficiaries are required to pay  for the connection, the meter  and domestic installation,
which become their property. In  1994 the government set a goal of  100% electrification
coverage among rural homes by the year 2005, with an intermediate target of 75% by year
2000. For this purpose, resources were increased substantially as from 1995, when a new
fumd was set up specifically to subsidize rural electrification projects. Prior to this, projects
were  financed  solely  through  the  General  Regional  Development  Fund  (GRDF)
administered by the Under-Secretariat for Regional Development in the Interior Ministry.
The GRDF allocates monies from the national budget to regional governments for
the  financing  of investment  projects  in  health,  education,  housing,  electrification,  etc.
Projects financed from this  source require prior  approval from the Ministry of Planning
(Mideplan), for which they need  to be  socially  profitable but  privately unprofitable, as
measured by standard valuation methodology. The allocation of funds depends on regional
needs  and the total  value  of the  investment projects the region  has registered  with  the
National  Project  Bank  administered  by  Mideplan.  Since  funds  allotted  to  regions  are
insufficient to cover all their investment needs,  regional govermnents have to select the
projects that in their view are of highest priority. In the GRDF program, rural electrification
18is in competition with other types  of project. For this reason, the government created the
Rural Electrification Program (REP), which operates in a similar way to the GRDF except
that its funds are reserved for rural electrification projects.
Central  government  allocates  REP  funds  to  regional  governments,  taking  into
account variables such as the region's  electrification deficit and the allocation  of GRDF
funds to rural electrification in previous years, thereby establishing a form of competition
between regions.  In the formula used to distribute REP funds among regions, variables are
weighted as  follows:  the  number of  non-electrified homes,  50%;  the value  of  projects
approved by  Mideplan waiting to be  financed,  15%; the coverage  shortfall below  75%:
20%; GRDF funds allocated to rural electrification during the previous three years: 15%.
Regions are thus encouraged to prepare rural electrification projects and finance them with
GRDF funds, in order to receive a greater REP allocation in subsequent years. In fact, the
GRDF  funds  that  regional  governments  assign  to  rural  electrification  have  increased
substantially since 1995.
In 1995, along with the creation of the REP, the type of project eligible for funding
was also broadened. Until that year, the GRDF only financed network extension projects
serving households. As from 1995, however, projects could now also include the provision
of street lighting, as well as supply productive activities and public services such as schools
and health centers. Also included were  self-generation projects in localities  far from the
concession areas of electricity companies. The evaluation methodology was altered to take
account of these changes. The measurement of benefits includes non-residential users, and
non-conventional energy sources are also evaluated for electric power generation (wind,
19solar panels, hydraulic  and hybrid  systems). In all  cases the desired end  product is the
supply of 220 volts AC at 50 Hz frequency, 24 hours a day.
Central  government  publicizes  the Rural  Electrification  Program  (REP)  at the
national, regional  and  borough  levels.  It  also  hires  consultants  to  work  with  regional
governments in designing electrification strategies. The procedure for applying to the REP
is as follows: the inhabitants of a locality without electricity supply organize themselves,
prepare a list of potential users, and request the municipality in which they live to undertake
an electrification project, alternatively the municipality itself may detect the corresponding
need. The municipality, in turn, requests a technical project and budget, at no charge, from
the  distribution  company,  or  else  occasionally  hires  a  consultant  for  this  purpose.
Municipalities collect the information needed to compute the project's  private  and social
NPV,  according  to  a  standard  methodology  developed  by  Mideplan.  The  regional
government then revises this evaluation.
By way of example we describe the methodology used to measure the benefits to
residential consumers. It is measured in terms of consumer surplus, in other words as the
area under the demand curve. The no-project price-consumption pair (Po, Qo)  is estimated
as  follows. The execution of  rural electrification projects  enables the population  to  cut
down on consumption of candles, paraffin, batteries or gas, and also reduce the time spent
purchasing such items. Estimates of these figures are converted  into their equivalents in
kWh per month (the consumption Qo)  and Ch$ per month (current spending on energy of
households  G),  respectively.  The  price  P0 is  obtained  dividing  expenditure  (G)  by
consumption (Qo).
20The with-project pair (PI,  Q1)  is determined in the following way. In principle,
electricity requirements are estimated from consumption categories in rural localities that
have electricity, where use has already stabilized (in other words, the community has had
electricity without rationing for at least five years). However, these figures  are modified
with the specific situation of the locality concerned. In the case of a network extension, the
price P 1 is equal to that applied in the nearest concession zone, plus surcharges for distance
when consumption occurs outside a 20 km radius from the nodes of a trunk transmission
line. In self-generation systems, the rate is agreed between the municipality and the service
provider, and must  at least cover the  costs of operating, maintaining  and  managing the
system.
The methodology further assumes constant price elasticity of demand. Thus energy
consumption  is given by Q = ape, where  a _ Qo/pe, and:
e = Ln(Q  I Q 1)
Ln(PO  I PI)
In  self-generation projects,  applications have  to  describe the  active institutions
existing  in  the  locality.  This  makes  it  possible  to  judge  whether  it  is  feasible  for  a
cooperative or other organization from the community itself to operate and maintain the
project;  however, there  tends  to  be  a  preference  for the  concession  being held  by  the
electricity  distribution  company  corresponding to  the  area,  due  to  the  need  for  future
extensions. Nonetheless, there are user  cooperatives in charge  of electrification projects,
such as  generation from biomass  gasification  on an island.  There are also  examples  of
distribution companies that have built self-generation projects using the State subsidy.
21With the funds provided by the central authorities, regional governments select the
rural  electrification projects  to  be  subsidized  and  transfer  the  necessary  funds to  the
municipalities.  These  usually  award  execution  of  the  civil  works  to  the  distribution
concession-holder  in  the area,  but where  there  is more than  one  distributor  capable of
providing the service, execution of the civil works is put out to tender. The new equipment
and networks are transferred to the distribution firms, which are then committed to operate,
maintain and manage them for at least 30 years. In recent years, the REP has transferred
about US$ 129 million in assets to distribution companies in this way.
Table 4: Rural electrification  program
(Ch$ million December1998 prices)
Year  Homes  Total  Average  Subsidy  as  % Rural
electrified  Subsidy  subsidy  per of  total electricity
household  investment  coverage %
1992  8,442  4,402.6  521.5  70.0  55
1993  9,123  4,982.3  546.1  70.0  57
1994  8,370  3,525.9  421.3  64.0  58
1995  17,933  9,508.0  530.2  63.0  62
1996  19,053  11,123.6  583.8  64.0  66
1997  19,107  11,626.9  608.5  62.0  70
1998  20,427  13,446.5  658.3  61.0  74
September  99  10,639  7,344.0  690.3  61.0  75
Total  113,094  65,959.8  4,560.0
Source: National Energy Commission
The incentive mechanism provided by the REP has had a considerable impact on
rural  electrification,  although  it  actually  only  provides  about  a  third  of  all  rural
electrification subsidies.  Total  subsidies  provided by the REP  and the  GRDF together
averaged approximately US$ 24 million per year between 1995 and 1997, and about US$
2230 million in 1998; in earlier years subsidies totaled less than US$  10 million. The average
number of households subsidized per year increased from 8,645 in  1992-94 to  19,130 in
1995-1998. Since the introduction of the REP, 113,090 rural homes have been electrified,
increasing rural coverage from 57% in 1994 to 75% by September 1999. As a result, the
aggregate target  set  for December  2000 was  achieved  15 months  early, although  some
regions still have a lower coverage (62% in Regions X and XI), and there were still 140,786
rural households without electricity in September 1999.
The cost of the subsidy per household has risen, as it has steadily benefited more
remote localities, growing from Ch$ 520,000 in  1992 to Ch$ 690,000 in  1999 at December
1998 prices; this situation ought to generate greater concern for costs. There are indications
that  the existing methodology  overestimates the  subsidies needed to  attract  distribution
companies. Firstly, in places where there are projects already operating, demand has grown
faster  than  the  rate  used  to  evaluate  the  projects,  so  the  income  flows  have  been
underestimated. Secondly, in projects put out to tender, the successful bidder has usually
sought a subsidy below the maximum allowable. This situation has led the authorities to
establish  various  forms of  yardstick  competition,  comparing  unit  costs  where  there  is
competition with places where there is none, or with those used in rate-setting processes.
Another  policy  has been  to  negotiate  the  execution  of  a  larger  number  of  projects  in
exchange for a reduction in the subsidies sought. The official in charge of the REP program
in the Xth Region estimates that the State saved about Ch$ 3 million or 20% in that region,
compared to the estimated subsidies, through the mechanisms described above.
In the XIth Region, civil works were put out to  tender among other firms apart
from  electricity distributors. However, the problem with this  is in  deciding who will be
23responsible  for  maintaining  the  installations,  as  companies  do  not  want  to  take
responsibility for maintaining installations whose quality has not been under their control.
Moreover, while this system might reduce the cost of the investment, the State has to take it
on in full. One way of reducing costs could be to set up electrification plans of more than
one year's  duration,  five years  for example, which would allow better programming of
electricity grids by planning all the civil works to be carried out over several years. This
would avoid ending up with inefficiently designed networks. Apart  from this, tendering
larger-scale  electrification  programs  would  make  it  possible  to  attract  other  operators
besides the local distribution company.
In self-generation projects, the government has tried to promote the use of clean
technologies, in particular promoting solar-panel solutions for localities in the north of the
country and hybrid  wind-gasoline systems  in  southern regions.  In  1998 two  large-scale
projects were studied, the first of which is a project in the IVth Region to provide electric
power to 6,000 households via solar panels. A portfolio of wind-powered projects was also
designed to  supply  3,500  homes  located  in  the  36  islands  that  make  up  the  Chiloe
archipelago in the Xth region. These two projects together  amount to  an investment of
nearly US$  18 million. Previously, the electricity distribution company in the IXth region
had been awarded two hybrid generation projects using wind and gasoline, but these have
not worked very well mainly because of the high maintenance costs involved. In fact, the
company has now interconnected one of the two locations to the grid.
244.  Telecommunications  Development Fund 8
The  situation  in  the  telecom  sector  is  different  from  those  of  the  water  and
electricity  services. Telephone  density nationwide  is relatively  low  - 21  lines per  100
inhabitants in  1999, which clearly shows that still there are vast sectors of the population
with  limited  or  no  access to  telecom  services.  A telephone  in  every  home  is,  for  the
moment,  a distant  goal,  although  it is realistic  to  consider universal  access,  for  which
reason the government created the Telecommunications Development Fund (TDF) in 1994.
Chilean telecom legislation defines the TDF mission as to promote the installation of public
telephones, available 24 hours a day, in low-income neighborhoods and remote areas, i.e.
areas  of  low  telephone  density.  Broadly  speaking,  the  government  subsidizes  projects
whose social rate of return is positive, but which are not profitable from the private point of
view. The maximum  subsidy is equal to  the lesser  of the negative private NPV  of the
project and the estimated cost of the investment.
The  Under-Secretariat  for  Telecommunications  (Subtel),  in  conjunction  with
regional governments and municipalities, carries out an annual campaign to publicize the
program.  Potential  beneficiaries  - individuals  or  community  organizations  - submit
applications to their local authorities. The application includes the name of the locality, the
number of inhabitants and the distance to the nearest public telephone. Municipalities and
regional governments make  an initial  selection, bearing  in mind that the project  should
favor low-income people, before dispatching the application to Subtel. The latter checks the
information in each application and hires consultants to prepare a list of technical projects.
This section builds on a report jointly written with Daniel Hojman (Hojman and Serra, 1999)-
25The consultants' job  consists of grouping localities together (average 36) and defining a
technical solution to minimize the investment cost. A basic theoretical engineering model is
used to choose the solution, based on parameters such as the geographic dispersion of the
phones to be installed, population density, the topography of the land, and the distance to
the  nearest  interconnection center.  The main  output of  this  stage  of the  process  is  an
estimate of the investment cost for each project.
Subtel then computes the social and private NPV of each project, using a standard
methodology. For each locality, the social benefit corresponds to the consumers'  surplus,
i.e. the area below the demand curve. In the with-project situation, price corresponds to the
regulated tariff, and  traffic  is estimated from  empirical data  in places that  have similar
conditions. 9 Initially, estimated traffic was calculated by assuming that households spent
8% of their income on communications services and that all households belonged to  the
second lowest quintile. Since 1999, however, traffic has been estimated using parameters
obtained from a regression on actual traffic in a sample of public rural phones subsidized
by the TDF. Statistical results  show  that per-capita traffic  declines  with the number  of
inhabitants. The figure used in the social and private evaluation of projects, for the monthly
number of  calls per  phone,  is  equal  to  2.2 times  the  number of  inhabitants  when  the
population is below  150. Otherwise, estimated monthly traffic is given by the expression
148 L0 16, where L denotes the population. As the tariff is fixed in real terms and equal for
all rural public phones, its effect on demand could not be isolated. But, for the same reason,
it is not required for estimating demand in new localities. In the no-project situation, the
price  corresponds to  the  cost  (including  the  value  of time)  of  traveling  to  the nearest
26existing phone, plus the cost of the phone call itself. The demand curve is completed using
price  elasticities  estimated  in  1994,  a  relatively  dated  estimate  given  the  changes
experienced by the sector in the last years.
Table 5: Subsidies allocated per company 1995-1999
FIRM  SUBSIDY ALLOCATED  PHONES ALLOCATED
Thousand Ch$  %  Number  %
CTC  2,642,407  28.1  1,880  31.8
CTR  1,481,186  15.8  1,843  31.2
GENEVA  190,000  2.0  153  2.6
GVT  3,421,843  36.4  1,737  29.4
MEGACOM  1,655.633  17.6  303  5.1
TOTAL  9,391,070  100.0  5,916  100.0
Source: Memoria 1999, Fondo de Desarrollo para las Telecomunicaciones, Memoria 1999, Subtel.
The government allocates resources  to the TDF through the annual public-sector
budget.' Then  Subtel  sets  the  priorities  and  selects  the  highest-ranking  projects  until
available funds are exhausted. Each selected project is then put out to public tender and
awarded  to  the  bidder  seeking  the  smallest  subsidy.  The  technology  chosen  by  the
successful bidder does not have to  match that used in computing the maximum subsidy.
Usually, competition  between bidders  determines the actual subsidy, and  the maximum
subsidy only serves as a cap in cases when there is only one bidder. For this  reason, the
authorities have been especially concerned to  ensure that several companies bid  for each
project.  In  the  first  year  only  two  companies  entered  bids:  CTC  and  CTR.  But  in
subsequent years a further three companies started bidding. Table 5 shows the participation
9 The regulated tariff is the same for all public rural phones and is indexed to the cost of living. Currently 100
pesos for 84 seconds.
27of each of the five companies; in some projects, however, there has been just one bidder, or
even none at all.
The method used to estimate investment costs is quite crude. For one thing, they are
estimated by using a theoretical model; and secondly, the technical project designed by the
consultant does not take existing infrastructure into account, so investment estimates tend
to  be biased upwards.10 The private  evaluation  of the project  does not  include  income
earned by the concession holder from installing new lines, whereas both existing and new
operators have extended their rural networks on the basis of projects financed by the TDF.
This reinforces the idea that the maximum subsidy is likely to be an upper bound to the rate
needed to make the investment privately profitable. However, a more rigorous and costlier
analysis is not justified for two reasons: firstly, the average subsidy granted per phone (US$
3,000)  is  relatively  low,  and  secondly,  the  actual  subsidy  is  usually  determined  by
competition between the bidders for the project.
Social  profitability  is  likely  to  be  underestimated,  since  investment  costs  are
overestimated and social benefits are underestimated, because the methodology used fails
to  consider either  the  benefits  from  installing  additional  lines  or the  gains  to  existing
subscribers. Most importantly, the social evaluation used excludes the value society assigns
to connecting isolated areas to telecom networks, possibly because, in standard cost-benefit
analyses, it is difficult to  include the social gains arising from mitigating the isolation of
remote locations where telephony is a basic need.
'° On the other  hand, companies  receive  the subsidies,  which  are expressed  in  nominal  currency,once  the
telephone  is operating,  on average  two years after the subsidy  is awarded.  Calculation  of the subsidy
considers  neither  inflation  nor the cost  of capital.
28A related issue involved an imprecise definition of public access to a telephone. It
was  not  until  1999  that  Subtel  defined  a  precise  aim  for  the  Telecommunications
Development Fund, namely to install public pay-phones in all rural localities with over 60
inhabitants, which are more than 3 km  or 30 minutes away from nearest existing public
phone.  Participation by  local authorities has increased  not only  in terms of refining the
information used in the social and private project evaluation, but also in deciding  which
projects to finance, where local agents have better knowledge of needs  in their particular
area. In fact, in subsidy programs related to other utilities, it is the regional authorities that
decide which projects are carried out. Only in telecommunications has there been a more
centralized and technocratic approach, which has both advantages and limitations.
The  Fund  has  dramatically  increased  the  access  of  the  rural  population  to
telecommunications; since its creation it has granted subsidies to install public phones in
5¾916  rural localities serving more than 2 million inhabitants. Taking projects approved in
1998 into account, 80% of the rural population will have access to public phones by mid
2001, compared to just  10% in 1995. The total cost of the subsidy program has been quite
low: in its five years of operation the Fund has compromised subsidies totaling US$  19,7
million (US$ 2.0 million in 1995, US$ 0.9 million in 1996, US$ 7,2 million in 1997, US$
5,4 million in 1998, and US$ 4,2 million in 1999). Actual expenditure has been much lower
than the amount  budgeted  for by  the  government,  since  firms  requested  52,4%  of the
maximum subsidy on average during the period 1995-1999, and the sum total of maximum
subsidies on projects put out to public tender cannot exceed the budget.
29Table 6: Subsidies allocated per year and localty
Year  Phones  Thousand  Available  Subsidies  Average  Subsidies 1
allocated  inhabitants  Funds  in  granted  in  subsidy  per  granted  as  %
benefited  current  current  localty  in  of available
million  CH$  million  Ch$  current  $  funds
1995  726  240  1,728  836
1996  1,632  761  3,555  371
1997  2,146  772  4,849  3,396
1998  858  227  3,200  2,545__
1999  554  154  2,300  2,243  _
Total  5,916  2,157  15,632  9,391
Source:  Memoria  1999,  Fondo  de Desarrollo  para  las  Telecomunicaciones,  Memoria  1999,  Subtel.
The subsidy per installed rural telephone is about US$ 3,000, compared to the US$
12,000 spent  before  the  Fund  came  into existence.  The  main  explanation  for  lower
subsidies than before is  the introduction of competitive bidding, although the figure is
rising (US$ 8,000 in 1999) as more isolated projects - with fewer collateral benefits - are
put to tender. In the period 1995-1997 firms thought about 40% of the maximum subsidy
on  average. But  this  figure is  raising:  in  1998 firms  sought  62%  and  75% in  1999.
Subsidies financed about 28 % of estimated total investment in 1995-97, but the figure had
jumped to 49 % by 1998. The cost of administrating the Fund has been low, accounting for
1% of total expenditure.
Although the program has been successful, giving access to public phones to about
80% of the rural population at relatively low cost, it has not been trouble-free. One major
problem is that it can take up to 3 years to install a phone. The bidding process lasts a whole
year  and  then  concession-holders have  up  to  24  months  to  install  the  corresponding
equipment. The problem could be mitigated if the installation date were to be included as a
bidding variable, rewarding bidders not  only for seeking the  lowest subsidy but  also for
installing the phones in the shortest time. The formula for selecting the winning bid should
30include the difference in social benefit from installing a public phone today, compared to one
that will be in service in 24 months' time. Another suggestion for cutting installation time is to
prepare a list of localities that satisfy the eligibility  requirements. The existence of a list would
do away with the need for a yearly publicity and applications program. Given the delay
between the application for a public telephone and its installation, it would be useful to inforn
beneficiaries of the contracted installation date and keep them up to  date on the state of
progress. This information is not currently provided, these days which is a  cause of great
dissatisfaction  among beneficiaries.
Apart from this, the deadline for starting services has been exceeded in some cases,
and Subtel had to fine 19 projects in 1998.11 By the end of 1998 only 1,110 units had been
installed  - just 65% of the phones due by that date. There are two reasons for the delay: firstly,
firms underestimated the geographic and weather challenges in certain remote areas; and
secondly, the parent company of one of the firms participating in the public tenders went
through serious financial difficulties; as a result that firm received 15 out of the  19 fines.
Sanctions  for delay are quite low, with a maximum penalty per phone for delays of over a year
set at I UTM (Ch$ 26,600 in January 2000).  The number of arrears, however, diminished
significantly in 1999.12  Of the 4,390 phones due, 92% was installed by the end of the year.
Moreover, 211 phones due in year 2,000 were operating by the end of 1999.
'  Subtel  imputed  28 projects,  of which 19  were fined, 5 were only  admonished,  and in  the remaining  cases  a
resolution  is still  pending.
12 In many  cases  the delay  was due  to aspects  beyond  the control  of the franchisee,  such  as an erroneous
identification  of the locality.
31Table 7: Number of phones due and installed by December 31, 1999
Year  Phones due  Phones installed  Percentage installed
1997  265  265  100
1998  1,551  1,436  92,6
1999  2,574  2,350  91.3
2000  1,078  211  19,6
2001  448
Total  5,916  4,262  72,0
Source: Memoria 1999, Fondo de Desarrollo para las Telecomunicaciones, Memoria 1999, Subtel.
A second problem has been the quality of the service - particularly its reliability.
The successful bidder takes on the commitment to maintain the public phone for ten years,
which is not a minor issue since some of the phones are in remote areas, and maintenance
and billing costs are quite high. There are indications that service quality, especially among
phones located in isolated areas, is not always the best: hence the need to monitor service
quality,  especially  its  continuity,  in  order  to  guarantee  fulfillment  of  the  standards
established in the regulations. One way of doing this would be through user surveys. Local
authorities are closer to the subsidy beneficiaries and so in the best position to carry out
such surveys; municipalities should therefore be active in monitoring public phones.
In some rural phone  concessions the franchise-holder delegates responsibility for
collecting payments to  an  administrator. Despite being public phones, they operate like
private telephones in terms of billing, which raises two problems. Firstly, it makes it hard
for the administrator to charge for long-distance calls, since invoices arrive with a delay.
Secondly, if the administrator fails to  pay the invoices on time,  the service is cut off,
thereby harming the entire community. Since 1999 it has been obligatory to  install coin-
operated phones, but this does not solve the problem of the telephones already installed.
Another problem  is  that  coin-operated telephones  sometimes break  down  because the
32concessionaire fails to  collect accumulated coins in a timely fashion.  A solution to this
would be to use pre-paid cards.
The Fund can also subsidize phone projects in  urban zones,  although despite the
scarcity of public pay phones in poor urban areas, no urban project has yet been subsidized.
The explanation for this is that the methodology used for computing the maximum subsidy
does not consider the replacement cost of  vandalized public telephones - probably the
major cost in public pay phones. As a result, public phones located in open spaces are not a
reliable  communication  system,  and  the  government  is  considering  a  review  of  its
methodology for granting subsidies.
One alternative would be to install phones in small shops or even in houses.
However, it would be difficult to keep these open 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, unless a
substantially higher payment than the 15% of revenue collected, used in the project
appraisal, is considered. Another solution would be to subsidize the installation of
residential phones, and even subsidize the fixed part of the bill, which amounts to about
US$ 10 per month. In this way, subsidized consumers would still face the marginal costs of
calls made. Mobile phones that use prepaid-cards have become quite popular among poor
people, where for the purchase of a US$ 40 card the customer receives cellular phone for
free. Since mobile phone pricing applies the principle of calling-party-pays, a mobile phone
owner can receive any number of incoming calls free of charge, but the cost of outgoing
calls is relatively high at US¢ 20 per minute. 
13 In a public pay phone, USO  9 buys a three-
minute call, so prepaid-card mobile telephony is expensive in per-minute terms, but quite
33useful  for emergencies.
'3The number  of mobile  phones  increased  from 410,000  in December  1997  to 2,105,000  in November  1999,
after "calling-party-pays"  pricing  was established  and two new mobile  operators  entered  the market,  cutting
prices by half.
345.  Analysis of Chilean utility subsidies
In  the  1980s new  regulatory  frameworks  were  introduced  for  all  utilities  in
anticipation  of their  privatization,  a  cornerstone  of  which  is  cost-reflecting pricing  for
services provided under monopolistic conditions. The new rate-setting schemes have two
aims: to allow firms to self-finance and encourage them to be efficient, with rates based on
the long-term marginal costs of simulated efficient firms. The regulatory amendment meant
raising charges when these did not cover the costs of providing the service, as in the case of
potable water, or rebalancing them when there were cross subsidies,  such as from long-
distance to local telephony. The geographic cross subsidies that pervaded all utilities were
also eliminated, and relatively cost-homogeneous pricing zones were defined.
The main reason  for introducing  cost reflective-rates  was to  eliminate economic
inefficiencies; from a forrnal static point of view the price should reflect the marginal cost
of providing the service. The elimination of cross subsidies had the additional benefit of
facilitating competition in services where it was possible for this to emerge. For example,
the cross subsidies in telephony operated through the access charge to the local network
paid  on  long-distance  calls,  which  was  several  times  higher  than  the  actual  cost  of
providing access. When the multicarrier system came into operation in 1994, these charges
were reduced substantially, although insufficiently. For that reason in the 1999 rate-setting
process they were reduced by an additional 62.7% on national and international outgoing
calls. In the case of incoming  international traffic, the charge was reduced by  97.5% in
normal hours and by 99.6% in off-peak periods. High access charges put competition  in
doubt during the period 1994-1999, and many long-distance operators went through serious
financial difficulties. The local telephony companies, which were allowed to operate in the
35long-distance market through  subsidiaries, had  incentives to  charge rates below cost  on
long-distance calls, since by lowering rates long-distance traffic would  increase and the
companies would benefit from the higher revenue arising from access charges to the local
network, a reward that the other long-distance companies did not have.
The  Chilean  experience  shows that  competition  produces  a  substantial  drop  in
prices on services that were previously regulated or had entry barriers, thereby eliminating
a significant deadweight loss. Once the long-distance service was deregulated in 1994, call
prices fell by over 50% (80% in the case of large clients), and when the mobile telephony
PCS system came into operation in 1998, increasing the number of mobil phone operators
from two to four, tariffs fell by approximately 50%. Energy prices at the generation level,
where  there is  some degree  of competition,  fell  by more than  50% between  1988 and
1998.'4 However, the price of electricity for residential clients dropped by only 25% in this
same period,  which  is  minimal  considering  that  apart  from  the  fall  in  energy prices,
distribution losses were cut from  19% to  8%, and labor productivity increased from 393
clients per worker to  703 in  1997 in the largest distribution  company. This  situation is
explained  by  the  fact  that  electricity  distribution  companies  are  regulated  regional
monopolies. The figures illustrate the importance of facilitating the entry of new operators
into previously monopoly markets.
Current utility charges in Chile consist of a monthly standing charge and a variable
rate.  The  latter distinguishes between  peak  and  off-peak periods.  Regulated prices  are
reviewed every four years in the case of electricity distribution, or every five years in local
14 This  is explained  by the fall in  prices of the fuels  used in power  plants  that determine  marginal  prices
(namely  the arrival  of natural  gas from Argentina),  or greater  use  of installed  power, and  the passing  on to
consumers  of productivity  gains.
36telephony and water and sewerage. In the intervening period they are adjusted in line with an
inflation index relevant to the sector. Current charges for residential consumers in Santiago
are as follows. The local telephony standing charge is Ch$ 5.356 per month, with a variable
rate of Ch$ 16.3 per minute during peak hours and Ch$ 2.7 in off-peak hours. Peak hours run
from 8 am. till 8 pm. on weekdays and from 8 am. to 2 pm. on Saturdays. In water services
the monthly fixed charge is Ch$ 882, the variable sewerage charge is Ch$ 51 per m 3, and the
variable drinkable water charge is Ch$ 133.3 per m 3. Summertime consumption of drinkable
water (December through March) in  excess of average consumption over the previous  12
months pays Ch$ 369.1 per mi
3. A similar approach was adopted for electricity services: the
pricing system consists of a fixed monthly charge of Ch$ 692 and a variable rate of Ch$ 39.3
per kWh. Consumers pay Ch$ 72.7 per kWh for their consumption in peak (winter) months in
excess of their average consumption over the preceding 12 months.
It is common for public services to be priced at marginal cost, with the difference
between marginal and average cost being covered by a fixed charge, equal for all users.
Marginal  cost pricing  in  a  two-part tariff  has been  criticized because  the  fixed part is
essentially  a  regressive  head tax  (Feldstein,  1972). Moreover,  cost-reflecting  two-part
tariffs are not always efficient. If enough consumers decide to disconnect from the service
when the fixed charges rises, it might be more efficient to maintain a low charge (G6mez-
Lobo, 1996). The social loss arising from excluding consumers from a market through the
fixed charge is equal to the surplus they would have perceived, less avoidable costs.
Fixed costs in Chile are generally not significant, and mainly correspond to meter
reading and billing - i.e. unavoidable costs. The exception is in local telephony, where the
fixed charge is not insignificant. The authorities in this sector claim that the standing charge
37represents the cost of the line that runs from the house to the switching exchange, for which
reason it is also unavoidable. If this is the case, a rebalancing of rates involving a lower
fixed charge and a higher variable rate would mean cross subsidies from people that use the
telephone for more minutes to those who use it less; the phone companies would give a
worse service to the latter, who would also tend to be the most poor. Something similar
would  occur if  there was a fixed  charge differentiated by income  level  or some other
variable that did not correspond to objective differences in the cost of providing the service.
In  addition,  having the  consumer pay  for  the  use  of  the  external network  facilitates
competition: any  service  that  does  not  require  the  switching  service  from  the  local
telephony company could use the external network without paying for it, except for the rent
of space in the switching exchange to install the equipment to channel the calls.
Cross subsidies do not always achieve their object of favoring the most poor. The
cross subsidy from long-distance to basic telephony was premised on the idea that local
telephony was more important than long-distance phone services in the consumption basket
of poorer people. However, as there was no obligation to provide the service, telephone
companies gave priority to installing telephones for higher income people likely to generate
greater long-distance traffic. In the mid-1980s the waiting list for basic telephony stood at
over 40% of all lines in service; and installation of a phone line could take more than 10
years, so the waiting list did not reflect real potential demand. In fact between 1987, the
year in  which rate rebalancing began, and  1999, the number of  lines multiplied nearly
sixfold. It also has to be remembered that the elimination of cross subsidies benefits the
most poor when the  fall in prices resulting from  greater competition offsets the initial
rebalancing of rates.
38How did the new pricing systems affect the poorest population sectors? As a result
of rate rebalancing in telecommunications, the local phone bill for an average family rose
from US$ 9.3 in  1988 to US  $25.1 in  1998.15  However, this  situation did not affect the
poor,  because in  fact they  did  not  have  access to  local  telephony.  The  change  in  the
regulatory system has allowed many more families access to basic telephony. Moreover,
improved regulation and greater competition in fixed telephony should reduce the effect of
the initial rebalancing on prices. The cost of electricity has  fallen, although not  enough
because of a  lack of  competition  in  the distribution  segment.  Regional rebalancing  did
affect small communities, where rates increased because of higher distribution costs.
Increases in drinking water charges clearly affected all consumers. The impact was
also greatest in areas where rates rose most because of higher production costs. As a result,
it  was essential  in  this  case to  create  a  consumption  subsidy.  Long-run  marginal  cost
pricing in rural areas, on the other hand, would mean prices that were prohibitive for rural
inhabitants, given the substantial economies of density that exist in public services. For this
reason, it was decided to subsidize investment so users would at least pay operating costs.
All subsidies, however, share two related characteristics: an emphasis on economic
efficiency and targeting on the poor. The main reason for targeting subsidies is to reduce
financial requirements. Taxes distort the economy, and the corresponding dead-weight loss
grows more than  proportionally  with  tax  rates. Reducing  the financial  requirement  by
targeting the subsidy on the poor has a direct benefit. On the other hand, targeting extremes
also has disadvantages, one of which is the possible lack of protection for families who are
not poor enough to be eligible for the benefit. The second is that when they lose all benefit
15 Part  of this change  is explained  by rate  rebalancing.
39by reaching a given level of income,  efforts to earn more income  are discouraged. The
consumption subsidy for drinking water is granted to the 20% poorest of the population, so
those who do not fall in this category do not receive any help, although their income might
actually be only slightly more than that of families that do receive it. If the subsidy were
implemented such that no family spends more than 5% of their income on water services,
this problem would be resolved.
There  is  a  great  concern  for  efficiency  in  subsidy  design.  For  that  reason,
investment projects are subsidized if they yield a positive social return, and a criterion used
for prioritizing projects has been the social NPV per peso of subsidy. The aim has also been
for users to perceive the opportunity cost of the service at the margin, which means that
rates continue to be cost reflecting, although only with respect to operating costs. For this
reason,  preference  has  been  given to  subsidizing  investment,  and,  in  the  case of  the
consumption subsidy for drinking water services, the amount subsidized has a limit above
which families pay the normal price. When families exceed this limit, as happens in most
cases, they face the real cost of the service, so providing the same amount of subsidy in
lump-sum form would have had the same result.
Whenever possible, investments in rural infrastructure are put out to tender among
different operators, thereby  obtaining  the benefits  of competition  for the field  between
different operators. In telecommunications the tendering of projects has made it possible to
substantially reduce the amount of subsidy granted, compared to the initial estimate by the
authority. In  electricity, in areas where two  distributing companies  overlap and projects
have been put out to tender, the subsidy required has turned out less than estimated. In the
drinking-water sector, investments so far have been carried out by publicly owned water
40companies.  However as  these are being privatized, the  execution of rural infrastructure
works will also begin to be put out to tender.
Subsidizing only  those  investment projects whose  social return is positive  is  an
appropriate criterion. However, the method of evaluation used in Chile only measures the
benefit of the project to those directly involved, without considering its effect on the utility
derived by society from the fact that rural inhabitants have access to utilities, or the various
externalities that  exist.  The  social  benefit  of the  project  is  measured  as  the  consumer
surplus perceived by beneficiaries, while the resources used by the project, valued at social
prices, constitute the project's social costs.'6
The  program  that  subsidizes  investments  in  rural  telephony  used  to  prioritize
projects according to the quotient between the social NPV and the required subsidy. As a
result, it tended to benefit localities that were less isolated, because in more distant areas
investment is more costly and population density is lower. Accordingly, remote localities
were seldom selected for subsidy, and the goal of connecting the most isolated zones was
not being fulfilled. As from  1999. the authorities changed policy by clearly defining the
objective of bringing the service to localities of over 60 inhabitants and more than 3 km or
30 minutes distance from the nearest public telephone. Thus, although the social evaluation
continues to be carried out, the program now has a more precise objective. Moreover, funds
were set aside for localities that are cut off for part of the year.
Another characteristic of Chilean utility subsidies is that usually it is the potential
beneficiaries who initiate the process by filling out an application form. This stems from a
16 Strictly speaking the exact measure of the change in welfare is the compensating variation, but consumer
surplus has been shown to be a good approximation to this.
41desire for citizens to participate in the programs, (as well as helping to target subsidies).
However, this  does not  always work  adequately, since the  application process may be
complex for the poorest people. Indeed, in the case of drinking water it was necessary to
allow the water companies to make applications on behalf of their users. In the case of rural
investment subsidies, the granting of subsidies in a more planned way would reduce costs,
by making it possible to expand networks in a  more rational manner. Perhaps the most
appropriate solution is a combination of these two strategies.
426.  Concluding  remarks
In Chile, cross subsidies have been virtually eliminated, and the existing subsidies
are  funded  from  the  national  budget.  This  has  facilitated  competition  in  some  public
services. Prices  have fallen  substantially in services where  new  operators have entered,
which, as in other countries, shows that regulation is a poor substitute for competition. The
decision to eliminate cross subsidies would therefore seem appropriate.
The Chilean experience also shows that is possible to design direct subsidies at a
relatively small cost for the  state, such as occurs with  drinking water. For this  purpose,
subsidies need to  be targeted  on the most  poor, although  care  needs to  taken  to avoid
leaving  other  needy  sectors  unprotected.  The  public  tendering  of  rural  infrastructure
investments, whenever feasible, has also made it possible to substantially reduce the need
for public financing.
Another lesson from the Chilean experience is that it is possible to design subsidies
that do not cause deadweigh losses, by making sure beneficiaries perceive the marginal cost
of providing the service. It may be important to distinguish between rural and urban zones:
in the former it is advisable to introduce consumption subsidies, with an upper limit on the
amount subsidized. In this way, when the family consumes over the subsidized amount, it
perceives at the margin the total cost of providing the service. In rural areas, where there is
no infrastructure, investment needs to be subsidized. In this case users do not pay the long-
run marginal cost, but the rate charged at least covers the short-run marginal cost.  Rural
utility charges are therefore required to cover the operating costs of the system.
Lastly, it is important to reiterate that the evaluation of subsidies must take account
43of the value society places on providing the most poor with access to public services that
are considered basic for existence, as well as special regard for the needs of consumers
living in rural areas.
44References
A1e, Jorge,  1990, "Estado  Empresario  y  y  Privatizaci6n en  Chile,"  Universidad Andre
Bello.
Blanlot, Vivian,  1999, "Evaluaci6n y analisis de la evoluci6n de las tarifas y subsidios y
proposici6n para su adecuaci6n al nuevo marco legal sanitario," report prepared
for the Economy Ministry, Santiago, Chile.
Doble, Michael, Eleni Markou and Catherine Waddams Price,  1998, "Utility Regulation:
Fairness  for  All,  Responses  to  the  Government's  Green  Paper,"  Centre  for
Management under Regulation Research Paper 98/4, University of Warwick.
Feldstein, Martin, 1972, "Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing: The optimal two-
part Tariff," Quarterly Journal of Economics LXXXVI, 175-187, May.
G6mez-Lobo, Andres,  1996, "The  Welfare Consequences  of  Tariff Rebalancing  in  the
Domestic Gas Market," Fiscal Studies 17: 49-65.
Harberger, 1978, "On the Use of Distributional Weighs in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis,"
Journal of Political Economy 86: S87-S120.
Hojman,  Daniel  and  Pablo  Serra,  1999,  "Evaluaci6n  del  Fondo  de  las
Telecomunicaciones,"  Departamento  de  Ingenieria  Industrial,  Universidad  de
Chile, report prepared for Subtel.
Mideplan, 1999, "Antecedentes Administrativos, Operativos y Legales del Subsidio al Pago
del Consumo de Agua  Potable  Servicios de  Alcantarillado de Aguas  servidas,"
Documentos MIDEPLAN, Santiago, Chile.
Waddams Price, Catherine,  1999, "Gas: Regulatory Response  to Social Needs,"  Lecture
presented in the IX IEA/LBS Regulation Series.
45Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2429  Corruption, Composition of Capital  Shang-Jin Wei  August 2000  H. Sladovich
Flows, and Currency Crises  37698
WPS2430  Financial Structure and Bank  Asli Demirguc-Kunt  August 2000  K. Labrie
Profitability  Harry Huizinga  31001
WPS2431  Inside the Crisis: An Empirical  Asli Demirguc-Kunt  August 2000  K. Labrie
Analysis of Banking Systems in  Enrica Detragiache  31001
Distress  Poonam Gupta
WPS2432  Funding Growth in Bank-Based and  Asli Demirgu,g-Kunt  August 2000  K. Labrie
Market-Based Financial Systems:  Vojislav Maksimovic  31001
Evidence from Firm-Level Data
WPS2433  External Interventions and the  Ibrahim A. Elbadawi  September 2000  H. Sladovich
Duration of Civil Wars  Nicholas Sambanis  37698
WPS2434  Socioeconomic Inequalities in Child  Adam Wagstaff  September 2000  A. Maranon
Malnutrition in the Developing World  Naoko Watanabe  38009
WPS2435  The Evolution of Poverty during the  Asep Suryahadi  September 2000  P. Sader
Crisis in Indonesia, 1996-99  Sudarno Sumarto  33902
Yusuf Suharso
Lant Pritchett
WPS2436  Safety Nets and Safety Ropes:  Sudarno Sumarto  September 2000  P. Sader
Who Benefited from Two Indonesian  Asep Suryahadi  33902
Crisis Programs-the  "Poor"  or the  Lant Pritchett
"Shocked?"
WPS2437  Quantifying Vulnerability to Poverty:  Lant Pritchett  September 2000  P. Sader
A Proposed Measure, Applied to  Asep Suryahadi  33902
Indonesia  Sudarno Sumarto
WPS2438  Measurements of Poverty in  Menno Pradhan  September 2000  P. Sader
Indonesia: 1996, 1999, and Beyond  Asep Suryahadi  33902
Sudarno Sumarto
Lant Pritchett
WPS2439  State-Community Synergies in  Monica Das Gupta  September 2000  M. Das Gupta
Development: Laying the Basis for  Helene Grandvoinnet  31983
Collective Action  Mattia Romani
WPS2440  Lessons from Uganda on Strategies  John Mackinnon  September 2000  H. Sladovich
to Fight Poverty  Ritva Reinikka  37698
WPS2441  Controlling the Fiscal Costs of  Patrick Honohan  September 2000  A. Yaptenco
Banking Crises  Daniela Klingebiel  38526Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2442  A Firms's-Eye  View  of Policy  and  Bernard  Gauthier  September  2000  L.  Tabada
Fiscal  Reforms  in Cameroon  Isidro  Soloaga  36896
James  Tybout
WPS2443  The Politics  of Economic  Policy  Richard  H. Adams  Jr.  September  2000  M. Coleridge-Taylor
Reform  in Developing  Countries  33704
WPS2444  Seize  the State, Seize  the Day:  Joel  S. Hellman  September  2000  D. Billups
State  Capture,  Corruption,  and  Geraint  Jones  35818
Influence  in Transition  Daniel  Kaufmann